Abstract. This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. The new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Suppose all the participators are rational, how to allocate the objects at what price so as to guarantee auctioneer's high revenue, and how high it is.
Introduction
In recent years, great progresses have been made in electronic commerce, especially in internet auctions, to which various theoretical and practical studies have been conducted. Besides governments use auctions to sell rights and assets, such as Federal Communication Commission, a lot of companies also use internet auctions to conduct business. There even exist some companies whose revenue depends almost on certain types of auctions. Over 98% of Google's revenue and 50% of Yahoo!'s revenue are derived from sales via keywords advertising auctions [7] .
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In this paper, we study a quite general yet very practical type of auctions, where both budget and copy constraints are present. In our model, a single seller sells multiple copies of a single kind of digital goods. During the process, each buyer reports one private unit value he is willing to pay for the item, one private number of copies he demands and one private budget that he is able to pay. We investigate the model from the perspective of the seller, and our aim is to present some auctions, whose performance can be theoretically guaranteed, that maximize the seller's revenue, with the basic assumption that buyers are rational and want to maximize their preferences.
Different from traditional models which shield complex factors by making certain assumptions, there are some additional considerations that distinguish our model in terms of real life applicability: 1. Our model is especially suitable for digital goods, which can produce unlimited copies with marginal cost zero, such as license sales, mp3 copies, online advertisements, etc. 2. We consider both copy and budget constraints. We argue that under most realistic circumstances, the demand of a buyer is limited. Redundant allocation will bring not profit, but resource waste. For example, issue 1000 copies of software license to a company with only 100 computers is no doubt an undesirable allocation result.
Besides studying the new auction model, this paper also has the following contributions:
-We introduce a new kind of mechanisms called win-win mechanisms. As we know, in two-sided markets the famous VCG mechanisms maximize the buyers' utilities and contrarily minimize the sellers' revenue. Interestingly, in our win-win mechanisms, each buyer's self-interested strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the seller. -The concept of competitive ratio is first introduced by [9] . However, [9] 's competitive ratio is only available to mechanisms with dominant strategy. We generalize the concept to unconditional competitive ratio, which is applicable to any mechanisms with equilibria. -For the model with both limited and unlimited supply goods, we present two win-win mechanisms with unconditional competitive ratio.
For the auctions with constraints, all the previous papers only considered budget constraint. [4, 12, 14] studied the model of one item to sell under the Bayesian-Nash budget constraint. In the last two years, [2] and [1] began to study the model of multiple units, multiple bidders with budget constraint. Our framework is inspired by the work of [8, 1] . Specifically, [8] studies the auctions with unlimited supply of digital goods. Each buyer in that model wants at most one copy without any constraint.
[1] studies the auctions with limited supply. But the buyers have budget constraint and their demands are unlimited. Since our model allows both unlimited and limited supply of goods and each buyer's bid consists of three parameters, clearly our model is substantially more complicated
